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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 10-2854 
_______________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
CARL BALL, 
       Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
For the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 1-09-cr-00493-1) 
District Judge:  Honorable Jerome B. Simandle 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2011 
_______________ 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, AMBRO, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 18, 2011) 
_______________ 
 
OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Carl Ball pled guilty to possession of a weapon by a convicted felon.  At 
sentencing, he requested a variance on the ground that his criminal history category 
overstated the severity of his prior conduct, and asked the Court to give effect to the 
2 
 
proposal to eliminate  U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) and disregard his two-point enhancement for 
recency.  The Court declined to do either, and sentenced Ball to 100 months‟ 
imprisonment, which was within the applicable Guidelines range.  On appeal, Ball argues 
that his sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We affirm.
1
  
I. 
 As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary for our 
decision.  In December 2008, Ball was found in possession of a .38 caliber revolver.  He 
was charged with a single count of possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  At his arraignment, Ball was released from custody 
on bail with conditions, including a $50,000 unsecured bond and house arrest with 
electronic monitoring.   
 Ball entered into a plea agreement with the Government in which the parties 
agreed that Ball‟s total offense level was 21.  The final presentence investigation report, 
consistent with the plea agreement, recommended a total offense level of 21, a criminal 
history category of V, and a Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months‟ imprisonment.   
 Shortly after the report was prepared, Ball assaulted his girlfriend‟s 16-year-old 
son, who suffered injury to his ear and received four stitches.  Several hours later, Ball 
informed his girlfriend he did not want to go to jail, cut off his monitoring bracelet, and 
fled.  He was apprehended two weeks later by federal marshals and his bail was revoked.   
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
3 
 
 Ball was sentenced in June 2010.  Based on his conduct while on pretrial release, 
the District Court applied a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for 
obstruction of justice.  The enhancement raised Ball‟s total offense level to 23, raising his 
Guidelines range to 84 to 105 months.  The Government asked for a sentence at the upper 
end of the range in light of Ball‟s criminal history and his conduct on pretrial release.  
Ball asked for a sentence within his initial Guidelines range—70 to 87 months.  He did 
not contest the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, but requested a 
downward variance in his criminal history category based on an overstatement of his 
criminal history and a proposal to eliminate U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e),
 2
 which would place 
him in criminal history category IV instead of V.   Although the Court considered Ball‟s 
request, it determined that a within-Guidelines sentence was necessary for specific and 
general deterrence and to protect society.  As previously noted, it imposed a sentence of 
100 months‟ imprisonment. 
II. 
We review a district court‟s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 328 (3d Cir. 2006). 
On appeal, Ball attacks his sentence on two grounds.  First he claims that it is 
procedurally unreasonable because the Court (1) failed to respond to one of Ball‟s two 
variance requests and (2) failed to explain adequately whether the sentence resulted from 
                                              
2
 Section 4A1.1(e) provided for two additional criminal history points where a defendant 
committed an offense less than two years after release from imprisonment (hence the 
name recency enhancement).  See Notice of Proposed Amendments to the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 75 FR 27388-01 at 27393 (May 14, 2010).  The section was eliminated in 
November 2010.   
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an upward variance or an upward departure,
3
 making it impossible to know whether the 
Court‟s failure to distinguish between a departure and a variance affected the selection of 
the sentence imposed.  Second, Ball argues that the Court‟s failure to give effect to the 
proposed elimination of § 4A1.1(e) resulted in a substantively unreasonable sentence.  
We disagree with each argument.   
A review of the record reveals that the District Court fully considered both of 
Ball‟s variance requests.  The Court addressed the criminal history argument first, with a 
lengthy analysis, and then returned to it when addressing the second argument about the 
proposed elimination of § 4A1.1(e).  Ultimately, it determined that, under the totality of 
the circumstances (including Ball‟s extensive and serious criminal past), a criminal 
history category of V did not overstate his prior conduct.  This was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
Ball‟s second procedural argument also fails.  He made clear at sentencing that he 
was requesting a variance, not a departure, as a matter of strategy.  All of the Court‟s 
rulings were made in the context of that request.  There was thus no confusion as to 
whether Ball‟s sentence resulted from a departure or variance.4    
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 “Departures are enhancements of, or subtractions from, a guidelines calculation „based 
on a specific Guidelines departure provision.‟ . . .  These require a motion by the 
requesting party and an express ruling by the court. . . . Variances, in contrast, are 
discretionary changes to a guidelines sentencing range based on a judge‟s review of all of 
the § 3553(a) factors and do not require advance notice.”  United States v. Brown, 578 
F.3d 221, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 
195 n.2 (3d Cir. 2006)).   
 
4
 Ball argues that, despite his request for a variance, the Court used language similar to 
the departure provision of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3.  However, given the context of Ball‟s 
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Finally, Ball‟ sentence was not substantively unreasonable.  The Court explained 
at length why it declined to disregard the recency points under § 4A1.1(e).  The sentence 
it imposed was within the Guidelines range in effect at the time of Ball‟s sentencing (the 
elimination of § 4A1.1(e) was not made retroactive) and 20 months below the statutory 
maximum.  Thus, again, the Court did not abuse its discretion. 
*   *   *   *   * 
 We affirm. 
                                                                                                                                                  
variance request, this was not enough to suggest confusion.  We allow district courts 
flexibility in applying the section 3553(a) factors.  See, e.g. United States v. Goff, 501 
F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[T]here is no mandatory script for sentencing.); Cooper, 
437 F.3d at 332 (“There are no magic works that a district court must invoke when 
sentencing . . . .”).   
